I. INTRODUCTION
Billy Roberts, a prisoner in an Alabama state prison, had a history of severe psychiatric disorders.! He was often put on suicide watch, and received large doses of psychotropic drugs. A managed health care company, Correctional Medical Services (CMS), was responsible for the health care at the prison. 3 After Roberts had a suicidal episode, CMS's statewide mental health care director reportedly put Roberts in an isolation cell rather than a psychiatric care unit. 4 The mental health care director also ordered that Roberts' medication be discontinued pursuant to an alleged policy of CMS to get as many prisoners off psychotropic drugs as possible in order to keep costs down. 5 Six days later, Billy Roberts hanged himself. 6 This is not an isolated case. In an effort to cut costs or to provide constitutionally adequate health care to inmates, an increasing number of prisons have been using managed care sys-tems to provide health care. 7 Although the use of managed care has saved states money, the quality of health care arguably has decreased. Inadequate care has been a recurring problem in prisons run by private managed health care firms. Consequently, prisoners and staff continue to complain, and prisoners are filing suits asserting that their constitutional rights have been violated. 8 Courts have evaluated claims of constitutional violations in cases in which prisoners have challenged the adequacy of their medical treatment under the "deliberate indifference" standard, first announced by the Supreme Court in 1976, in Estelle v. Gamble. 9 In Estelle, the Supreme Court established that, when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of prisoners, the prisoners' Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment has been violated.' 0 In Ancata v. Prison Health Services," for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, "if necessary medical treatment has been delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate indifference has been made out.
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Financial considerations constitute "non-medical reasons."' 3 Thus, the use of managed care in prisons with the intent of cutting costs may constitute an institutional deliberate indifference on the part of the prisons.
care. These systems require the inmate to pay a small fee for certain types of services. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1997 ) (holding that co-payment statutes as implemented are constitutional). Co-payment statutes have come under attack, but have thus far been held constitutional as long as they require payment only from inmates who have the resources to pay. See id. The plaintiffs in Reynolds challenged the co-payments under the deliberate indifference standard. See id. at 172. They argued, first, that the co-payments were per se unconstitutional, and second, that the co-payment system as implemented was unconstitutional. See id. The court held that the co-payment scheme was not per se unconstitutional: "[i] f a prisoner is able to To understand how managed health care works in prisons, it is first necessary to consider why counties or states would choose managed health care for their prisons. While some of the reasons are logistical, the primary concern is always financial. 18 A. MANAGED CARE There are three major components of a managed care system: (1) the managed care organization (MCO), which acts as an insurer and finances the health care of the members of its health care plans;' 9 (2) the health care provider, which can be a physician, a group of physicians, a hospital, or a physicianhospital association; 2° and (3) the health plan member or patient. 21 Managed health care evolved as a reaction by health care consumers and the federal government to rapidly escalating 22 health care costs under the traditional fee-for-service system. pay for medical care, requiring such payment is not 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." ' Id. at 174 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) ). The court also held that the co-payment scheme as implemented did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See id. at 178-79; see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 n.7 (1983) ("Nothing we say here affects any right a hospital or government entity may have to recover from a detainee the cost of medical services provided to him.").
" 303-06 (1998) . In an attempt to cater to varying consumer demands, MCOs take on a wide variety of forms. See infra note 25 (discussing the rationale behind different forms of MCOs).
20 See Sm & SINGH, supra note 19, at 303-06.
21 See id. "From 1962 "From to 1975 , the Consumer Price Index reported that medical costs rose 59%, more than any other major category of personal expenses. See ROBERT G. SHOULDICE, INTRODUCrIONTO MANAGED CARE 28 (1991) . This dramatic increase rendered the fee-for-service system, in which patients or their health insurance programs paid health care providers a fee for each service performed, unworkable because the patients or their employers could not continue to pay the escalating insurance premiums. See id. at 17-29. Congress responded by passing the Health Maintenance Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300(e) (1994) , which encouraged the expansion of MCOs through federal assistance. See id. at 36. Since 1973, the number of MCOs has grown
The term "managed care" generally refers to a variety of administrative and treatment practices that attempt to improve the quality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of the health care system." Although virtually all forms of health insurance now incorporate managed care to some degree, 24 for-profit MCOs are at the forefront in the application of managed care practices.2 Because MCOs compete with one another to offer the lowest monthly fees to consumers, they must control health care costs through policies designed to reduce both the cost and the amount of care provided.
Because MCOs contract with employers for a fixed perpatient or per-incident fee, the MCO assumes the financial risk 27 that costs will exceed that fixed amount.
For this reason, MCOs have a great incentive to minimize high-cost treatments, particularly those that require hospitalization or the consultation of specialists.
2 s Because many MCOs pass the risk along to health care providers through fixed fees, doctors and other health care professionals face similar incentives to provide less treatment at a lower cost2 However, the risk that the provision rapidly and, as of 1997, an estimated 85% of employees from firms with 10 or more employees were covered by some form of managed care. 25-26 (1998) . 24 See Marsha Gold, The Changing U. S. Health Care System, 77 MILBANK Q. 3, 8-9 (1999) . In response to demands for health care plans that provide a choice of providers at a low cost, MCOs have taken on a range of forms and implemented a variety of managed care policies in an attempt to attract the most health care plan enrollees. See SHI & SINGH, supra note 19, at 313-21. For example, the two largest types of MCOs-health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs)-compete for consumers by striking different balances between provider choice and cost-containment. See id. HMOs generally maintain the lowest fees by limiting enrollees to an approved group of providers. See id. At a higher fee, PPOs allow enrollees to choose any provider, but encourage use of approved providers by covering their treatment at a higher rate. See id. 216 See id. at 303-12.
2See id. at 303-04; Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition, 22J. HEALTH POL'Y& L. 339, 342 (1997) .
" See Davies &Jost, supra note 14, at 379-93. 2See id.
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of a low quality of care will cause the MCO to lose its contract with the consumer, or the provider to lose its contract with the MCO, acts as a counter-balance to incentives to cut costs to a point at which the quality of care becomes unsatisfactory to consumers. 3 ' Nevertheless, there is a strong concern that, left to its own devices, the market will not strike an acceptable balance between cost and quality in the provision of health care. One way that managed care controls costs is through a utilization review strategy. 2 MCOs oversee the decisions made by health care providers in order to ensure that the providers are conforming to the standards set by the MCO.
3 3 If the providers do not conform to these standards, they can suffer financial penalties. 4 While there may be some debate whether managed care provides better or worse care for the patient, 3 5 it is clear that " See supra note 25 (describing the competition between MCOs to provide the most service at the lowest cost); Walter A. Zelman, Consumer Protection in Managed Care, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 158, 163-64 (discussing consumer choice of managed care plans as a vehicle for consumer protection).
-1 See Zelman, supra note 30, at 158 (discussing consumer fears about health care quality in managed care systems). 
See id.
On the one hand, MCOs argue that reduced quantity does not mean reduced quality:
Advocates of managed care challenge conventional wisdom when they claim that doing less produces a greater outcome for the patient than taking action .... Managed care is a unique form of health-care delivery because it is premised on the idea that often, in medical care, less is more. What produces value in managed care is a good health outcome rather than medical intervention. ARNOLD BIRENBAuM, MANAGED CARE: MADE IN AMERICA 13-14 (1997) . On the other hand, the effects of managed care on health care quality have not been proven one way or the other:
One of the current realities of health policy making is that anecdotes far outweigh solid evidence when it comes to shaping the attitudes of people in relation to the performance of managed care.... Quality-of-care evidence from fifteen studies showed an equal number of significantly better and worse HMO results, compared with non-HMO plans. However, in several instances, Medicare HMO enrollees with chronic conditions showed worse quality of care.... Fears that HMOs uniformly lead to worse quality of care are not supported by the evidence .... Hopes that HMOs would improve overall quality also are not supported, in part because of slow clinical practice change, lack of risk-adjusted [ Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 7, 7-8 . But see STATE AUDITOR OF TEXAS, AN managed care provides less care to patients and prevents health care providers from using additional treatments and unproven medical intervention. 6 One of the positive aspects of managed care is that the application of business principles can reduce health care expenditures and thus allow a greater number of individuals to receive health insurance by keeping premiums low. 7 In addition, unnecessary treatments and unnecessary hospitalization are sharply reduced. 38 Managed care also encourages the use of preventive care, as patients are forced to rely more on primary care physicians.
On the other hand, doctors make less money than they do under the fee-for-service system.
Moreover, as described above, MCOs second-guess doctors' judgments, as doctors need to get approval from MCOs for tests and surgical procedures. 4 In this way, managed care can undermine the role played by doctors in treatment decisions by compromising medical considerations with financial concerns, thereby lowering the standard of care.
B. MANAGED HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS
Managed health care in prisons is conspicuously different from managed health care on the outside. First, the general prison population is usually less healthy than the general population. Second, the quality of health care in prisons is usually AUDIT REPORT ON MANAGED HEALTH CARE AT THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JusncE 49 (1998) [hereinafter TExAS AUDIT] (statement of David P. Smith, M.D., President of the Correctional Managed Health Care Advisory Committee: "Texas offenders are being provided increased access to a higher quality health care at a lower cost than by pre-managed care practices.").
lower than the quality of health care provided to the portion of the outside population covered by managed care. Third, the patients in a prison setting have no choice regarding health plans; they must take the plan provided for them." Fourth, if the health care provider in the prison refuses to provide treatment, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the prisoner to get treatment elsewhere. 45 In its structure, however, prison managed care is the same as general managed care. MCOs hire health care providers and supervise their provision of health care the same way in prisons as they do in general managed care. Ultimately, the focus is on efficiency and cutting costs, since the primary goal of MCOs is enhancing the financial bottom line. 47 
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Prisons may contract out a variety of health services. For example, the contract for Texas Correctional Managed Health Care demonstrates the typical arrangement in a prison managed care system. 8 In this contract, Texas state universities provide complete medical services to the prisons. 59 The contract contains a fee-per-offender provision that limits the amount the health care provider must spend on each inmate.w The fee-peroffender varies with respect to "the services provided and the differences in demographics and health status of the inmates.' Other forms of service contracts are more limited and provide only specific off-site services, such as dental care or psychological care. 62
Accreditation Standards
There are some non-governmental means of ensuring the quality of care provided by a correctional managed care entity. One such means is accreditation. Accreditation of prison managed care systems is governed by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC). Accreditation is by no means mandatory; it merely provides companies with a seal of MCO.6 The process for receiving NCCHC accreditation is not stringent. It consists of completing a Self-Survey Questionnaire and having an accreditation site visit.0 The NCCHC assures prospective accreditees that the site visit will be "scheduled only when you feel you are ready."6 The NCCHC examines the following areas: "facility governance and administration, managing a safe and healthy environment, personnel and training, health care services support, inmate care and treatment, health promotion and disease prevention, special [inmates'] needs and services, health records, and medical legal issues., 67 Thus, the accreditation provides for external peer review to ensure that correctional health care systems meet certain standards for the provision of health services. ts NCCHC accreditation may be beneficial to the companies, but it ensures only a basic level of care in prisons. 6 9 However, judicial standards on health care in prisons impose more rigorous requirements on MCOs. The United States Supreme Court, through a series of cases, has specified "deliberate indifference" as the threshold for prison health care. 70 MCOs that are deliberately indifferent to prisoners' serious medical needs will be held to have violated the Eighth Amendment.
[hereinafter NCCHC Website]. According to the NCCHC, the benefits of this optional accreditation are adding prestige to facilities, improving employee morale, aiding recruiting efforts, obtaining increased budgets, and improving community support. See id. NCCHC also states that accreditation can reduce "liability premiums and [can protect] facilities from lawsuits related to health care." Id. In applying the subjective component to determine whether medical care violates the deliberate indifference standard, courts focus on the obviousness of the risk. A court needs to ascertain whether the prison official had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind"; the court must look at the events as the prison official may have seen them. Courts should examine whether the prisoner's medical condition was noted by other prison officials or doctors. 89 Courts should also consider factors such as "the severity of the medical problem, the potential for harm if medical care is denied or delayed and whether any such harm actually resulted from the lack of medical attention." 9 In McNally v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 9 ' for example, the Federal District Court in Maine denied a prison's motion to dismiss. The prisoner alleged a § 1983 violation for inadequate medical care when he was denied HIV medication while a pretrial detainee. 92 The court stated that "deliberate indifference is more than negligence. 93 The court also stated that "'when a supervisory official is placed on actual notice of a prisoner's the prisoner told PHS of his need to take medication immediately, his doctor confirmed his HIV diagnosis, and the prisoner was suffering from obvious physical symptoms, the court held that it could be inferred that PHS was subjectively aware that the 95 prisoner required medical care.
There have been many challenges to the adequacy of prison medical care under the deliberate indifference standard. 96 The plaintiff in a § 1983 claim must show that the injury in question was inflicted by state actors and that the injury involved a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States.
B. LIABILITY OF INSTITUTIONAL DEFENDANTS
Municipalities can be found liable for their official policies and customs. The liability of a municipality under § 1983 may not be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 9 8 Municipalities can be held liable only for acts that constitute a government custom or policy9
Liability is not limited to official policies, however, and may be based on the prevailing customs of the municipality. 1°° In Nelson v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 0°f or example, the Federal District Court in Florida stated: "In order to prove the county's liability based on custom, '[the Plaintiff] must establish a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law."", The court in Nelson examined the issue of how to determine when a "custom or policy" rises to the level of deliberate indifference.°3 The court stated that "a county must be held accountable for more than its officially-codified policies."' 0 4 The plaintiff can base his or her case on customs or policies of the institution. However, the custom or policy must be "longstanding and widespread" and considered to be "authorized by the policynaking officials because they must have known about it but failed to stop it." 1 05 The Nelson court held that the liability imposed on PHS "mirrors that of the test for the County."'1 ' In addition, a plaintiff must prove that the custom or policy caused the violation of the prisoner's rights. o9 Id. at 826 n.8.
In City of Canton, the Supreme Court confronted a civil rights action in which the respondent claimed that she had received inadequate medical attention while in police custody."' The Court refused to adopt the petitioner's proposed standard that there could be § 1983 liability only if "the policy in question is itself unconstitutional." ' The Court held that a municipality's failure to train its employees can be a policy for which the city may be held liable if the failure to train causes a constitutional violation.1 2
C. LIABILITY OF PRIVATE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Using the deliberate indifference standard, courts have examined the liability of private health care providers who have contracted to provide services for the government. These providers can be found liable for a § 1983 violation if, inter alia, the court finds that state action is present. When a corporation contracts with a state to provide medical services at a correctional facility, the obligations of the Eighth Amendment attach to the provider. Thus, the private company becomes a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability.
In He requested to see a doctor but was denied treatment until two-and-one-half months later, when he was diagnosed with a fractured ankle.' The court found that municipal liability need not be based on any particular action, as long as the municipality "promoted a policy which sanctioned the type of action which caused the violations." 126 The plaintiff alleged that Westchester County demonstrated such a policy by allowing EMSA to provide medical care to inmates even after being put on notice that EMSA provided deficient care.
1 27 To support his theory of deliberate indifference, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the county publicly announced its intention to end its contract with EMSA when a female inmate committed suicide after EMSA took her off antidepressants without consultation and a newspaper article recounted several inmates' complaints about EMSA's care in Westchester County.
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In denying defendant's motion to dismiss, the court relied on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Ancata to find that the Westchester County Jail may be "directly liable for any constitutional violations committed by EMSA."'9 The court stated that the case should proceed in order to determine if EMSA had violated the deliberate indifference standard. 8 In addition to Ancata, the Covington court cited Williams v. Ward 3 ' to support the proposition that municipal liability can be based on acquiescence in a health care provider's negligence. 32 Williams alleged that an unlicensed physician's gross negligence caused his leg to require amputation. 3 The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that, "in hiring... an unlicensed physician and delegating the medical care of inmates at Attica Correctional Facility to him, defen- In the Second Circuit case, Archer v. Dutcher," 9 the court addressed the situation in which a pregnant female prisoner alleged that her constitutional rights had been violated by inadequate prison medical treatment that resulted in the loss of her baby. 140 The court held that the facts presented were suffi--cient to constitute a claim that medical treatment had been denied to the prisoner "as punishment for past breaches of the disciplinary code, or for other invalid reasons."
The court specifically stated that the failure to provide medical care to the prisoner "in order to make [her] suffer" would undoubtedly satisfy the requirements for a claim under Estelle.14 Thus, Archer stands for the proposition that a treatment decision based on non-medical considerations constitutes deliberate indifference.
Similarly, the court in Ancata, citing Archer, held that placing financial considerations ahead of the medical needs of the prisoner can rise to the level of deliberate indifference.
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The Eleventh Circuit wrote that, "if necessary medical treatment has been delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate indifference has been made out."" 4 The court held that the plaintiffs allegations that the defendants put the financial interests of PHS ahead of her medical needs were sufficient to state a constitutional claim.'4
F. INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY OF PRIVATE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
The foregoing standards provide a basis for private health care providers who have contracted with the government to be found liable on an institutional basis for constitutional violadons. Private health care providers can clearly be held liable under the state action doctrine for constitutional violations of prisoners under their care.
Thus, a managed care organiza- 
G. CHALLENGES UNDER THE STANDARD
This section summarizes the facts from some of the challenges to prison medical care under the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference standard. As is evident from these examples, that standard is most often discussed in rulings on motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. If the plaintiff succeeds on these motions, the medical care company typically will settle to avoid going to trial.
4 9 This practice leaves a lack of articulated standards on the subject, and a less developed deliberate indifference standard for purposes of determining liability of managed health care providers. after significant delay in receiving medication for his seizures. The plaintiff alleged that PHS had a custom of inadequately staffing the infirmary, "permitting its on call physician to employ a covering doctor who was unfamiliar with prison protocols, and delegating treatment decisions to nurses and physician assistants," thus causing the delay. 58 The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to Kelly's serious medical needs.' 9 In CMS's statewide mental health director allegedly ordered Roberts to be placed in an isolation cell rather than a psychiatric care unit and ordered that his drugs be discontinued. 63 Six days after Roberts stopped receiving medication, he hanged himselfl' 4 The court found sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to Roberts' serious medical needs to deny CMS's motion for summaryjudgment. 5 In these three cases, the courts found that there was sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference. However, because the MCOs settled out of court after these rulings, the courts did not get a chance to decide whether the facts of these cases actually constituted deliberate indifference. Other cases are currently pending. On June 23, 1998, a group of prisoners at EastJersey State Prison brought a class action suit against government entities responsible for their medical care, and against employees of CMS, who had been contracted to provide the medical care at the prison. 1 6
The complaint alleges that the governmental entities and CMS failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care. 67 The complaint further alleges deliberate indifference by CMS because CMS utilized cost-cutting measures that resulted in the injury and death of several inmates.'6 Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that CMS withdrew psychotropic drugs from inmates who needed them, canceled scheduled surgeries, and had inadequate staffing at all of the Department of Corrections facili- [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . The complaint also alleges that GMS misrepresented itself when it bid for the contract. See id. at 1 20-22. CMS allegedly gave false information about pending litigation, and stated that they had a "good track record." Id.
[Vol. 90 ties. 9 The complaint also describes the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions of the medical facilities at the prison.
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This case is particularly significant because it alleges that the cost-cutting measures used by CMS, a managed care organization, are deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of the prisoners.
IV. CAN THE USE OF MANAGED CARE CONSTITUTE "DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE"?
This Article examines whether the use of managed care alone can constitute deliberate indifference. As discussed previously, managed health care companies can be found liable for constitutional violations through state action and institutional liability.
17 ' A municipality that enters into a contract with a private corporation for the provision of inmate health care creates an official policy regarding the health and welfare of those persons for whom it is responsible and should be held liable for injuries resulting from that policy. 72 Managed health care contracts, whether or not in a correctional setting, are generally entered into as a means of cutting costs.17 Although managed 9 See id. at 11 [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] v. Westchester, No. 96-Civ.-7551, 1998 WL 26190, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1998 (citing Ancata and denying county's motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that the adequate treatment, it is also well established that liability will not be imposed if it is found that an inmate merely disagrees with the treatment or medication provided. Several courts have refused to find deliberate indifference where inmates objected to the types of medication or treatment prescribed, or to the dosage provided.
The ultimate difference between the two lines of cases is whether the prescribed treatment could be considered adequate, even if less costly than other available options." 8 Deliberate indifference, however, is the state of mind requirement. The "objectively sufficiently serious" requirement promises that liability will not be imposed where inmates are adequately treated.'" The requirement that an alleged injury be serious and caused by the deliberate indifference of the defencounty had a custom of denying adequate medical care by allowing EMSA to continue to provide medical care to inmates after county was on notice that EMSA had previously provided constitutionally deficient medical care). For other cases discussing a custom or policy of making medical decisions based on non-medical reasons, see Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1997 ) (reversing the grant of CMS's motion for summary judgment where inmate alleged that CMS had a policy of destroying or ignoring inmates' requests for medical treatment, resulting in a ninemonth delay before his tooth infection was treated); Proffitt v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 01A01-9604-CV-00144, 1996 WL 426779 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 1996) (reversing lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PHS where plaintiff alleged that delay in receiving surgery was caused by policy of putting profits before medical needs). L. REv. 417, 454-59 (1992) (arguing that the culpability of individual defendants should not determine municipal liability because the presence or absence of a deliberately indifferent custom or policy is independent of an individual employee's acts in accordance with such a policy).
' ' Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985 ) (citing Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1984 
)).
182 See supra notes 135-36 (listing cases).
Although the negligent actions of an unqualified or undertrained health care provider would not be sufficient to meet the culpability requirement of the deliberate indifference standard, the MCO is deliberately indifferent because it has knowingly hired that provider. See Kritchevsky, supra note 180, at 454-60 (arguing that the culpability of individual defendants should not determine municipal liability because the presence or absence of a deliberately indifferent custom or policy is independent of an individual employee's acts in accordance with such a policy).
'84 See supra Part III.E (discussing the impropriety of basing medical decisions on non-medical factors, including finances).
180 See infra Part IVA (discussing per se liability).
188 See infra Part IV.B (discussing rebuttable presumption of liability).
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A. PER SE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Among the myriad provisions found in contracts between municipalities and MCOs, financial incentives to avoid treating inmates have generated the most controversy.
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Contractual provisions that directly encourage health care providers to deny medical treatment or provide less efficacious treatment establish a policy of placing financial considerations above the health and safety of inmates. When an inmate is seriously harmed because of a decision to deny adequate treatment in favor of financial benefits, the policy should be considered per se deliberate indifference to the health of the inmate.
Direct financial incentives to avoid treating inmates, in the form of bonuses to individual health care providers, jeopardize the welfare of inmates. Pinellas County, Florida, for example, entered into a contract with EMSA for prison health care.8 The contract provided a $250 bonus to the medical director, Dr. David R. Webb, for every emergency 911 call that could be avoided.' 9 In 1996, inmate Melony Bird died from a heart at-,'7 See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text (discussing widespread criticism of bonuses given to prison doctors). In addition, some courts have recognized the problematic nature of financial incentives discouraging treatment by requiring MCOs and health care providers to disclose the existence of such incentives to plan members. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the failure to disclose is a breach of the MCO's fiduciary duty to its enrollees). ,89 See id. Other correctional health care companies have offered similar bonuses. Dr. Kevin Martin, a former medical director for CMS, claims that he was unofficially offered a bonus in exchange for reducing the medical procedures he ordered. See Kim Bell & William Allen, Former CMS Doctor Says Bottom Line Ruled, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 27, 1998, at G5. According to Dr. Martin, CMS offered him a $30,000 bonus in his new contract if he was able to reduce medical expenditures at his site, stating, "'You've got this $30,000 hanging over your head if you'd maybe just order a few less surgeries.' They don't come out and say it but that's what they mean." Id. The Texas state correctional health care provider (two medical schools in the state operating under an HMO-type contract) has been attacked for awarding $668,000 in bonuses to 60 prison docfors in 1997. See Michael Berryhill, Following the Money, HOUSTON PRESS, Jan. 12, 1998, at *2. The bonuses raise questions about whether the tack after Dr. Webb vetoed a 911 call to get her help.'O Although tests revealed the possibility that she was having a heart attack, thirteen hours elapsed before any help was summoned.' 9 ' Several weeks after Bird's death, Charles Henderson, another Pinellas County inmate, was allegedly injured as a result of EMSA preventing nurses from calling 911.192 Henderson filed suit against the county, EMSA, and Webb alleging that Webb vetoed a nurse's request to get emergency care for Henderson when he fell into a coma after EMSA staff injected him with fluids containing sugar, despite records indicating he was diabetic.' 9 Henderson contended that EMSA's failure to summon help led to disabling nerve and heart damage. ' In January 1997, Pinellas County revoked its contract with EMSA and entered into a contract with Correctional Physician Services (CPS), dropping the bonuses from the new contract. 9 5 Bonuses such as the ones provided in the Pinellas County contract represent a municipal policy of elevating cost-cutting measures above inmate health. Municipal liability is properly imposed only if the custom or policy of the municipality causes the harm. 96 Where, as here, the policy does not facially instruct employees to injure inmates, liability is proper where the policy evinces deliberate indifference to inmate health by placing individuals in a position where it is "all but inevitable" that an injury will ensue. 97 ... See id. Despite dropping the bonuses from the new contract, CPS retained most of the staff previously employed by EMSA and kept a contractual provision identical to the one found in EMSA's contract that provided for a $25,000 per-incident threshold. See id.
" See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (stating that municipal liability can be imposed where an official custom or policy caused individuals to violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff).
"' Kritchevsky, supra note 180, at 471; see also Canton, 489 U.S. at 387 (finding that a municipality can be liable for constitutional injuries where there was a custom of [Vol. 90 treating inmates, a municipality virtually ensures that an inmate will suffer serious harm, thus demonstrating per se deliberate indifference to the health of the inmates.
B. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Other practices and policies of managed care in prisons give rise to a rebuttable presumption of deliberate indifference. A rebuttable presumption is a legal fiction that requires the existence of a fact (the presumed fact) to be accepted as true upon proof of other facts (the basic facts).198 Once the basic facts establish the presumed fact, the party opposing the presumed fact bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to justify finding that the presumed fact does not exist.'9 If the opponent fails to rebut the presumed fact, it is concluded to exist. 2 0° If, however, the opponent introduces any evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the prevailing view holds that the presumption ceases to have any effect and the presumed fact will be accepted only if the trier believes it to exist. 01 failing to train guards adequately, thus evidencing deliberate indifference to the safety of inmates 2" The theory that a presumption disappears once the opponent introduces evidence contradicting the presumed fact is attributed to James Thayer and John Wigmore and is often called the Thayer-Wigmore theory. SeeJAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PREumIARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 336 (1898); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMOE ON EVIDENCE § 2490 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1981). The Thayer-Wigmore theory is used in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVrD. 301 ("[A) presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion. . . .") (emphasis added). In contrast, Morgan and McCormick's theory holds that the presumption continues to have effect even after the opponent introduces contrary evidence. The Morgan-McCormick theory states that a presumption should not only shift the burden of producing evidence, but also the burden of proof (or nonpersuasion), such that a presumed fact will be accepted unless the opponent introduces evidence sufficient to convince the trier of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. See MCCORMICK, supra note 198, § 342; Edmund M. Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245, 246, 249 (1943) ; see also The Evidence Project-Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 330, Courts and legislatures create presumptions "in accordance with a group of factors sometimes referred to as the Three P's: Policy, Probability, and Possession of Proof.
2 0 2 The social policy furthered by a presumption can justify its creation even absent a reliable inference leading from the basic facts to the presumed facts. 03 Presumptions, however, generally reflect a logical inference and thus avoid expending time and energy on proving what is probable. 0 4 In addition, presumptions are frequently designed to place the onus of producing evidence on the party 2051 in the best position to do so.
The use of managed health care in prisons should give rise to a rebuttable presumption under all three justifications. First, because inmates are at the mercy of the state's or county's Wigmore theory with Morgan-McCormick theory and recommending revision of Federal Rule of Evidence 301 to encompass Morgan-McCormick theory by providing that a presumption "imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence"). "
2 W~iGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 198, § 5122.
"-'The presumption of the legitimacy of a child born to a married woman cohabitating with her husband is given as an example of a presumption based, at least in part, on the policy favoring the legitimacy of a child. SeeJAMEs ET AL., supra note 198, § 7.17 (giving presumption of legitimacy as example of presumption in which the presumed "would not even be a permissible inference from" the basic facts); see also McCoRmvci, supra note 198, § 343 ("[T] he presumption of ownership from possession... tends to favor the prior possessor and to make for the stability of estates.").
204 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 198, § 5122 (stating that a decision to create a presumption requires asking: "'what will be the probable state of facts in most cases?' so that the burden of showing an idiosyncratic course of events can be placed on the party asserting the unusual"). The presumption that a properly addressed and mailed letter reached the addressee is an often given example of a presumption rooted in a rational inference. SeeJAMES ETAL., supra note 198, § 7.17. Because presumptions are generally rooted in the probable, they frequently continue to have an effect on the finder of fact even after the opponent introduces some evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact regardless of whether the supra note 198, § 7.17 (citing Frissell v.John W. Rogers, Inc., 106 A.2d 162 (Conn. 1954) ).
choice of health care, it should be presumed that MCOs, as state actors, are executing their constitutional duty. Social policy dictates that, if an MCO is pursuing a policy of understaffing, hiring underqualified staff, delaying or denying necessary treatment, or maintaining any other policy that creates an unjustifiable risk that financial considerations are being placed over medical considerations, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the MCO is acting with deliberate indifference.
Second, a logical inference exists that, when a municipality decides to save money by contracting with a private company and an inmate is seriously injured in the face of the cost-cutting practices of managed care, the injury was caused by the deliberately indifferent policy of placing costs before inmates' health. In an effort to cut costs, several disturbing practices have emerged indicating that MCOs are compromising inmates' health in order to save money: staffing levels have decreased; underqualified staff are responsible for inmates' health; 2 07 less expensive, but also less efficacious, treatments are provided; Jackson v. Fauver (D.N.J. June 23, 1998 ) (No. 98-2880 . The plaintiffs in Jackson allege that the health care provided to them by CMS at East Jersey State Prison is constitutionally deficient for a variety of reasons. See id. A pro se complaint filed by a group of inmates alleges that CMS's cost-cutting measures have resulted in inmates being taken off needed psychotropic measures and inadequate care for inmates, a rebuttable presumption that an injury was a result of a deliberately indifferent policy of placing costs before inmates' health is warranted.
Third, the managed health care company is in the best position to provide proof on the issue of deliberate indifference. The company is in possession of information concerning hiring practices, hiring records, records of treatment, and the policies of the company. It should not be the burden of the inmate to prove facts that the company clearly already knows.
A rebuttable presumption of deliberate indifference for certain aspects of managed care would place the burden of proof on the managed health care company. When an inmate has demonstrated serious injury while in the care of an MCO, a rebuttable presumption should attach where the inmate can show that the injury was the result of: (1) inadequate or denied treatment; (2) inadequate staffing; or (3) any other managed care practice that creates an unjustifiable risk that finances are being placed over medical considerations.
Treatment-Based Controversies
A common feature of inmate health care contracts is perincident thresholds capping the financial responsibility of the MCO. 211 Such thresholds provide that the company is responsible for the costs of an inmate's outside medical care only up to a certain dollar amount and that the municipality is responsible for all costs beyond that threshold 2 Because MCOs are always paid a per-inmate fee for providing medical care, thus being paid the same whether the inmate remains healthy or becomes Mar. 8, 1998, at 19A (reporting Va. 1998 ) (overruling the finding of a Special Judge that high thresholds discourage treatment); Nitkin & Lipka, supra note 188, at 1A (stating that $50,000 threshold for outside medical care "gives the company a financial incentive to treat inmates at the jail for illnesses and injuries that would be traditionally be treated in an emergency room"). 216 It is unclear whether preventive treatment of inmates-a standard cost-cutting practice of MCOs outside of prisons-constitutes medically necessary treatment under the deliberate indifference standard. For example, if an inmate over 50 years of age with a family history of colon, prostate, or other cancer does not receive preventive screening, a court would likely rule that this lack of treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference because the inmate has not suffered harm as a result of the deprivation. However, because males over 50 face a substantial risk of developing cancer, the argument could be made that the risk to male inmates over 50 is sufficiently obvious to require preventive screening. See What You Need to Know About Cancer (visited Jan. 14, 2000) <http://cancemet.nci.nih.gov/wyntk-pubs/index.html> (National Cancer Institute website providing information about the risk factors associated with a variety of cancers The prison officials challenged Judge Starcher's limit on thresholds, alleging that there was no evidence that the $5,000 threshold created a systematic deficiency in the prison health care system. 222 The Supreme Court of Appeals agreed with the prison officials that there was insufficient evidence in the record that the threshold caused medical treatment to be denied. 223 Despite the holding, however, the court went on to state that its decision was based solely on the lack of evidence in the record and that it was "not passing judgment on the logic or wisdom of (judge Starcher's] reasoning or belief on this issue. 224 The following sections illustrate how managed health care has resulted in the denial of necessary treatment, the use of less expensive but less efficacious treatments, and harmful delays in treatment.
a. Treatment Denied
Many inmates who receive their medical care from MCOs allege that they have been denied access to necessary medical procedures as a result of efforts to lower health care costs. 2 screws in her knee. 240 Her initial medical exam revealed that the screws needed to be removed and surgery was approved.
2 4 ' Despite approving the surgery, however, PHS never scheduled the surgery and the screws remained in Proffitt's knee until after she was paroled six months later. 2 PHS asserted that the delay was due to the relatively low priority level of the surgery, but presented no evidence of higher priority cases that actually rendered them unable to schedule the surgery. 4 Based on this evidence and the affidavit of an internal medicine expert that the surgery was clearly necessary and must have been delayed for non-medical reasons, 244 the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision granting summary judgment in favor of PHS . In addition to delaying treatments until the inmate is released, MCOs have been accused of transferring inmates to other facilities and prematurely releasing inmates in order to avoid paying for necessary medical procedures. Between 1995 and 1997, despite its own policy dictating that medical procedures are to be performed before transferring inmates, EMSA reportedly transferred forty-three inmates to other facilities 246 where different companies handled the inmates' health care. Among the transfers, at least two jeopardized the inmates' health, some occurred on the same day that treatment was 214 See id. at * 1. 241 See id. 212 See id. Proffitt was recommended for parole to the Samaritan Recovery Center three months prior to her actual parole, but was denied release to the Center because her leg remained untreated. See id. 21 See id. at *5 ("Uncontradicted evidence that needs of higher priority actually did render defendant unable to supply the services sooner might suffice, but such specific and definitive evidence was not offered."). 244 See id. at *4 (citing affidavit of Charles A. Rosenberg, M.D., an internal medical specialist and consultant in the field of correctional medical care). 246 See Nitkin & Lipka, supra note 188 (discussing EMSA's transfer of inmates despite their own policy dictating that medical procedures are to be performed before transfers take place).
Hartman v. Correctional Medical Services,25' for example, an inmate with psychological problems, being treated by an unlicensed psychologist, committed suicide after being taken off suicide watch. 2 The plaintiff in Hartman alleged that CMS's policies of allowing unqualified persons to treat mental patients and of prematurely taking patients off suicide watch in order to avoid using extra manpower caused the inmate's death.s
The introduction of the market rationale to prison health care in the form of managed care has created distinct patterns of cost-cutting practices that are deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of inmates. Municipal liability is properly imposed if an official custom or policy is deliberately indifferent to inmates' health. 4 The use of MCOs, with their emphasis on cutting costs, has created a well-documented risk that medical decisions are being based on financial considerations that result in constitutionally inadequate treatment. s 5 The prevalence of problems associated with privatized correctional care is sufficient to put jail and prison officials on notice of the risk that managed care practices will result in constitutionally deficient medical care. Thus, when an inmate under the care of an MCO is seriously harmed and can demonstrate that this harm was the result of inadequate treatment or staffing, or any other managed care practice that creates an unjustifiable risk that financial concerns are being given priority over medical considerations, a rebuttable presumption that a policy or custom of deliberate indifference exists is warranted. 6 Courts " 960 F. Supp. 1557 (M.D. Fla. 1996 16 See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (finding that, in a limited number of circumstances, municipal liability is proper where prison officials fail to alleviate an obvious risk of serious harm); Covington v. Westchester, No. 96-Civ.-7551, 1998 WL 26190, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1998) (allowing plaintiffinmate to proceed to discovery where plaintiff alleged that the county was deliberately indifferent in allowing EMSA to continue to provide medical care to inmates af-must guard against systematic violations of inmates' Eighth Amendment rights by carefully scrutinizing managed care practices in prisons.
V. CONCLUSION
In an effort to cut costs, many state and county incarceration facilities have turned to private managed health care organizations to provide health care for their prisoners. Despite-or, perhaps, because of-the money saved by the government and the money made by managed care organizations, the level of health care in these facilities has decreased, and prisoner complaints and lawsuits are on the rise. Private managed health care in prisons has resulted in inmate injuries and deaths, many of which have been and are being challenged on Eighth Amendment grounds.
Constitutional violations in prison health care are determined under the deliberate indifference standard. The Supreme Court has held that government entities, or private companies carrying out governmental duties, can be held liable for systemic deliberate indifference violations where the entity promulgates an official custom or policy that violates prisoners' constitutional rights. Without question, some managed health care systems in prisons contain aspects that constitute an official custom or policy that violates prisoners' constitutional rights.
Some aspects of managed care, particularly direct financial incentives to avoid treating inmates, constitute per se deliberate indifference. Courts should find that the implementation of these policies always fails constitutional muster. Other aspects of managed care create a rebuttable presumption that deliberate indifference exists. Measures to save money-such as cutting staff, hiring less qualified staff, and denying, delaying or providing inefficacious treatment-can give rise to a rebuttable presumption that deliberate indifference has occurred.
Legislatures should consider banning private managed health care in prisons and jails. In the alternative, legislatures might consider enacting and departments of corrections might ter county was on notice that EMSA provided substandard care that resulted in the death of an inmate).
[Vol. 90 consider contracting for provisions that ensure the adequate treatment of inmates. Absent these alternatives, the use of managed health care in incarceration facilities, and the decreased level of care that comes along with it, should remain under the constant vigilance of federal and state courts, whose obligation it is to enforce the Constitution of the United States.
